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 China’s navy is undergoing a leadership transition not seen in a generation� Between late 2014 and the time of this writing (spring 2015), the upper 
echelons of leadership within the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy, or 
PLAN) began experiencing substantial change in personnel, with eleven of the 
fourteen positions on the navy’s Party Committee Standing Committee (referred 
to below as the PLAN Standing Committee)—the navy’s highest decision- 
making body—turning over (see table 1)�1
Many of these new leaders have been promoted from one of China’s three 
fleets: the North Sea Fleet (NSF), East Sea Fleet (ESF), or South Sea Fleet (SSF)� 
In 2014, for example, Vice Admirals Tian Zhong and Jiang Weilie, former NSF 
and SSF commanders, respectively, both became PLAN deputy commanders, a 
position that carries with it a seat on the PLAN Standing Committee�
Tian and Jiang typify the PLAN’s Rising Cohort� 
Born in the mid-1950s, these two officers came of 
age in a navy that was just beginning to reform� 
Since then, they have gained direct experience 
with the navy’s new missions, including far-seas 
operations� They are increasingly at ease conduct-
ing international naval diplomacy� Vice Admirals 
Tian and Zhong have led PLA delegations abroad, 
Vice Admiral Tian to Russia, North Korea, and 
South Korea and Vice Admiral Jiang to the United 
States�2 In 2014, Vice Admiral Jiang served as the 
PLA’s highest-ranking officer in attendance during 
China’s first-ever participation in the U�S�-led Rim 
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of the Pacific naval exercise (RIMPAC 2014)�3 Other officers newly promoted 
to the PLAN Standing Committee have similar experiences and qualities� Vice 
Admiral Qiu Yanpeng, a former ESF deputy commander, is a model officer for 
China’s far-seas expeditionary navy, having led one of the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden 
escort missions, training missions near the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands, 
and multiple exercises with foreign navies�4
More changes are on the horizon� Before the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth 
Party Congress in October 2012, rumors circulated of PLAN commander 
Name Position
First Year on 
PLAN Standing 
Committee




PLAN Commander 2006 
Lt� Gen�  
Miao Hua
PLAN Political Commissar 2014 Political Commissar,  
Lanzhou Military Region
Vice Adm�  
Wang Dengping
PLAN Deputy Political  
Commissar
2014 Director, PLAN Political Department 
Vice Adm�  
Ding Haichun
PLAN Deputy Political  
Commissar
2014 Political Commissar, East Sea Fleet 
Vice Adm�  
Tian Zhong
PLAN Deputy Commander 2014 Commander, North Sea Fleet 
Vice Adm�  
Jiang Weilie
PLAN Deputy Commander 2014 Commander, South Sea Fleet 
Vice Adm�  
Liu Yi
PLAN Deputy Commander 2011–12 
Vice Adm�  
Ding Yi
PLAN Deputy Commander 2014 Deputy Commander, North Sea Fleet 
Vice Adm�  
Du Jingchen
PLAN Deputy Commander 2011 PLAN Chief of Staff 
Vice Adm�  
Wang Hai
PLAN Deputy Commander 2015 North Sea Fleet Chief of Staff 
Vice Adm�  
Qiu Yanpeng
PLAN Chief of Staff 2014 Deputy Commander, East Sea Fleet 
Rear Adm�  
Yang Shiguang
Director, PLAN Political  
Department
2014 Director, Political Department,  
East Sea Fleet
Rear Adm�  
Xu Weibing
Director, PLAN Logistics  
Department
2011 
Rear Adm�  
Wang Jianguo
Director, PLAN Equipment  
Department
2014 Deputy Director, PLAN  
Equipment Department
TABLE 1
CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE PLAN STANDING COMMITTEE
NWC_Spring2016Review.indb   67 3/8/16   10:29 AM
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/7
 6 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Admiral Wu Shengli’s retirement�5 Although this did not come to pass, he is al-
ready the oldest member of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest 
decision-making body within China’s military�6 As a CMC member, Admiral Wu 
has no known formal retirement date� However, past practice suggests he will 
step down no later than the Nineteenth Party Congress, scheduled for 2017, when 
he would be seventy-two�
These changes raise a number of questions for those interested in China’s naval 
modernization� How do China’s new navy leaders compare with their fellow se-
nior officers, and how will they affect the PLAN’s ongoing modernization efforts? 
The PLA Navy’s transition from a coastal-defense force to a blue-water navy has 
garnered significant attention in both policy and academic circles�7 However, 
an examination of the individuals overseeing the PLAN’s transition largely has 
been missing from this discussion� This article seeks to fill that void through an 
examination of the PLAN’s current leadership transition�
CHINA’S NAVY LEADERSHIP IN TRANSITION
To do so, the article examines three groups of officers� The first is the PLA Navy’s 
Old Guard: leaders who joined the PLA in the late 1960s and came of age largely 
during the Cultural Revolution, one of the most tumultuous and chaotic periods 
in modern Chinese history� These officers, however, are rapidly retiring, and are 
being replaced by the second group examined here, the PLAN’s Rising Cohort� 
This cohort consists of officers who joined the PLA largely in the mid-1970s to 
early 1980s and came of age when the PLA was just beginning to transition from a 
coastal-defense force to a blue-water navy� Naval officers who have recently tran-
sitioned into leadership positions, including those described above, are members 
of this group� Members of the third group constitute the PLAN’s Future Leader-
ship� These officers joined the PLA in the late 1980s and early 1990s and came 
of age during years of rapid economic growth and development� Although they 
have not yet ascended to leadership positions, the PLAN’s next leadership core is 
likely to be selected from this cohort�
This is a watershed moment for China’s navy leadership� The reforms of the 
past two decades have been led by a generation of leaders who, while extraordi-
nary in many ways, had little opportunity to experience the types of operations 
they were tasked with readying the PLAN to undertake� They came of age in 
a PLA that was ideologically oriented, internally focused, and concerned with 
coastal defense� However, they have successfully overseen the development of 
an increasingly professional, modern, and international navy� Their successors, 
members of the Rising Cohort, have played an important and hands-on role in 
the PLAN’s modernization program and led many of China’s early blue-water 
operations, including historic global circumnavigations, training missions into 
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the western Pacific, and early anti-piracy escort operations in the Gulf of Aden� 
Thus, for the first time in modern history, China’s navy will be led by officers for 
whom at-sea and blue-water experience is the norm rather than the exception�
Following on their heels is the PLAN’s Future Leadership, the first cohort of 
officers to join a Chinese navy that had already established a professional military 
education system and begun taking on more-expansive roles and missions before 
they joined� Not only do officers of this cohort have experience with blue-water 
operations, but they have experience operating in concert with foreign navies in 
combined military exercises and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/
DR) missions� Their eventual promotion into leadership positions will likely cre-
ate a second watershed moment for the PLAN, for the service will then be led 
by officers experienced in not only engaging but operating with foreign navies, 
enabling them to incorporate many of the international best practices learned 
from these experiences�
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows� After a brief examination 
of PLAN leadership in historical and organizational perspective, the article 
compares and contrasts the retiring Old Guard with the Rising Cohort, focusing 
primarily on changes within the PLAN Standing Committee� It then provides a 
comparative analysis of all three cohorts� The paper concludes by examining im-
plications of this leadership transition for the PLAN and the PLA more broadly�
PLA NAVY LEADERSHIP IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
PLAN leaders have historically carried little weight in the Chinese military or 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hierarchy� Early navy leaders were simply 
ground force officers and Party personnel transferred from elsewhere� The 
PLA Navy’s first commander, Xiao Jingguang, spent his early military career in 
Guangdong, Wuhan, and Changsha� After Mao selected him to head the navy, 
there was still significant debate whether the navy would be an independent 
service or housed within the General Staff Department�8 It was not until 1988, 
when career submariner Zhang Lianzhong was promoted to commander, that the 
PLAN was led by a career naval officer�9 The PLAN’s first career-navy political 
commissar did not come until the promotion of Zhou Kunren in 1993� In 2004, 
for the first time in the reform era, the PLA institutionalized the practice of hav-
ing the commanders of each of the three nonground services (the PLAN, the 
PLA Air Force, and the Second Artillery) serve concurrently in the CMC, thus 
increasing the influence of these services in relation to the traditionally dominant 
ground forces�10 Yet only recently were PLAN officers serving in military posi-
tions outside the navy allowed to wear their navy uniforms rather than the olive 
green of the ground forces�11
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From these humble beginnings, PLA Navy leaders appear to have gained con-
siderable influence within the PLA over the past decade (see the figure). Detailed 
information on budgetary spending by service remains unavailable, but it is clear 
the PLA has made naval modernization a high priority, with acquisitions from 
abroad and construction of new ships and weapons platforms.12 To be sure, the 
PLA remains ground force–centric, but navy officers are now found in all levels 
of China’s military and hold positions of great importance within the larger PLA 
hierarchy. 
HOW CHINA’S NAVY LEADERSHIP IS ORGANIZED
PLAN leaders hold important positions within the PLA’s four general depart-
ments: the General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department 
(GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), and General Equipment Depart-
ment (GED). These four organizations are tasked with coordinating and oversee-
ing work within their specific purviews throughout the PLA. The GSD is respon-
sible for planning, organizing, and directing military operations, and leads the 
PLA’s modernization program. The GPD manages the political relationship be-
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PLAN LEADERS THROUGHOUT THE PLA
Source: Adapted from Becker, Liebenberg, and Mackenzie, Behind the Periscope, p. 15.
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GLD oversees logistics work� The GED, also referred to as the General Armament 
Department, oversees weapons and equipment development and maintenance� 
This four-department structure is mirrored in China’s navy: the PLAN has a 
headquarters department, which serves a function similar to the GSD’s, as well 
as political, logistics, and equipment departments� Many lower-level departments 
(erjibu, 二级部) found in the PLA’s four general departments are also replicated 
within the PLAN� For example, the GSD Military Affairs Department is respon-
sible PLA-wide for promulgating manuals and developing policies related to PLA 
career tracks; the navy’s Military Affairs Department at PLAN headquarters has 
similar responsibilities within the PLAN�13
Of China’s seven military regions (MRs), PLAN leaders serve in three (the 
Jinan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou MRs), and in China’s three fleets, which are bu-
reaucratically subordinate to the three respective MRs, with the commander of 
the fleet serving as deputy commander within that MR� 
Most navy leaders are found at PLAN headquarters, or within the headquar-
ters of one of the three fleets� However, PLAN personnel are increasingly holding 
positions of importance in central-level organizations and the MRs� Admiral Sun 
Jianguo, for example, is one of five deputy chiefs of the PLA General Staff, and 
chair of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, a think tank for the 
Second Department of the PLA General Staff Department, the organ responsible 
for human intelligence gathering and analysis�14 Vice Admiral Liu Zhuoming, son 
of the 1980s naval reformer Admiral Liu Huaqing, serves as the deputy director 
of the General Equipment Department’s Science and Technology Commission, 
a body responsible for overseeing high-priority defense science and technology 
aspects of the PLA’s modernization program�15 Rear Admiral Guan Youfei is the 
director of the Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs Office, the primary 
organization that manages China’s foreign military relations, while Rear Admiral 
Li Ji serves as one of his deputy directors�16 Other PLAN officers serve as heads 
of navy departments or joint logistics departments within the MRs, maintaining 
force readiness and overseeing naval military training� 
DEFINING PLA NAVY LEADERSHIP 
There exists no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a leadership 
position within the PLA Navy� The few discussions of PLAN leadership that exist 
focus almost exclusively on the PLAN commander, at most extending to a few 
members of the PLAN Standing Committee�17 However, such a limited scope of 
discussion leaves out many officers with influence over day-to-day operations 
and over the PLAN’s long-term strategic direction� With this in mind, this article 
substantially expands the discussion of PLAN leadership to encompass the fol-
lowing positions: 
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• PLAN headquarters
• The PLA Navy commander and political commissar
• PLA Navy deputy commanders and deputy political commissars 
• The PLA Navy chief of staff and deputy chiefs of staff 
• The directors, political commissars, and deputy directors of the navy’s  
political, logistics, and equipment departments 
• The directors of second-level departments
• China’s three fleets
• Fleet commanders and political commissars 
• Fleet deputy commanders
• Fleet chiefs of staff and deputy chiefs of staff 
• Directors of the fleet political, logistics, and equipment departments 
• The four PLA general departments
• Naval officers serving as deputy chiefs of the general staff
• Naval officers serving as assistants to the director of a general department
• Naval officers serving as directors or deputy directors of PLA first-level 
departments
• The military regions
• Naval officers serving as MR deputy chiefs of staff
• Naval officers serving as deputy directors of MR logistics departments
• Naval officers serving as directors of MR navy departments 
Definitions of PLAN “leadership” will remain subject to debate� However, 
the positions listed above all entail extensive responsibilities for portfolios that 
provide their incumbents with immediate PLAN-wide or fleet-wide influence� 
Focusing on these positions, this article relies on a data set of profiles of eighty-
eight different PLAN officers serving in these positions� 
A YOUNGER PLAN LEADERSHIP
Before 2014, one of the most striking qualities of PLA Navy leaders was their 
advanced age� Almost every PLAN Standing Committee member had begun 
his military career in the late 1960s or early 1970s and had come of age during 
the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), when China experienced what amounted to 
a low-intensity civil war�18 In 2013, seven of the thirteen PLAN Standing Com-
mittee members had joined the PLA between 1964 and 1969, while four joined 
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between 1970 and 1972� 
Only Logistics Depart-
ment director Xu Weibing 
was younger,  having 
joined the PLA in 1978�19
PLAN leaders were 
also considerably older 
than their foreign coun-
terparts� For example, in 
2013 the average age for the eleven serving U�S� Navy admirals (O-10) was fifty-
seven, compared with an average age of sixty-four for the three PLA Navy officers 
of comparable rank�20 Admiral Wu Shengli, born in 1945, was eight years older 
than his USN counterpart at the time, Admiral Greenert�21 To put this in perspec-
tive, Admiral Wu’s continued tenure as PLAN commander would be roughly 
equivalent to the U�S� Navy being led by an officer whose formative experiences 
came during the middle period (1965–69) of the Vietnam War�
Recent changes have injected younger blood into the PLAN Standing Com-
mittee� In early 2014, immediately before the most recent round of personnel 
changes, the average age of this body’s members was sixty-two; today it is fifty-
eight�22 Only two actively serving members, Admiral Wu and Vice Admiral Du 
Jingchen, joined the PLA in the 1960s (see table 3)�
Moreover, fewer senior PLAN officers are remaining on active duty past the 
age at which retirement is mandated, which provides opportunities for younger 
officers to move up the ranks� Since the 1990s, the PLA has worked to normal-
ize retirement ages for high-level officers, and roughly two-thirds of the officers 
examined herein joined the PLA between 1970 and 1980�23 This appears to be 
true across the PLA� For example, after examining the careers of 107 PLA com-
manders and deputy commanders serving since 2005 in the army, navy, and air 
force, we found only seven officers within this group who had remained on active 
service past their respective retirement ages�24
CHINA’S EAST COAST: THE CRADLE OF PLA NAVY LEADERSHIP
Studies of civilian and military leadership under previous Chinese leaders Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao have shown an overrepresentation from eastern coastal 
provinces such as Shandong and Jiangsu and an underrepresentation from 
southern coastal provinces�25 This is true for PLAN leaders under Xi Jinping as 
well, as most PLAN leaders come from the eastern third of the country, with a 
significant portion hailing from the same east-coast provinces as under Jiang 
and Hu� We identified the hometowns for forty-nine of the eighty-eight officers 
examined within this data set� All of those officers hail from the eastern third of 
PLA Navy Officers U.S. Navy Officers
Admiral/General 64 Admiral 57
Vice Admiral 61 Vice Admiral 56
Rear Admiral 58 Rear Admiral 55
Senior Captain 52
TABLE 2
AVERAGE AGES OF SELECT PLA NAVY AND U.S. OFFICERS
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the country (see the map)� Moreover, of those forty-nine officers, thirty-nine are 
from coastal provinces such as Shandong (eight) or Jiangsu (eight), with others 
hailing from Zhejiang (five), Liaoning (four), or Beijing (four)� In contrast, we 
could not identify any navy leaders from western provinces such as Qinghai, 
Gansu, Sichuan, or Tibet� 
Some provinces that are home to critical naval installations, such as Guang-
dong, home of the South Sea Fleet, or Shanghai, home to important bases for the 
East Sea Fleet, each have only one leader in this data set, and no representation 
on the PLAN Standing Committee� Eight of the fourteen current PLAN Stand-
ing Committee members hail from Jiangsu (three), Shandong (three), or Hebei 
(two) (see table 3)� 
THREE COHORTS OF NAVY LEADERS
The section below compares and contrasts members of the navy’s past, pres-
ent, and likely future leadership across a wide range of factors, including key 
TABLE 3
HOME PROVINCES AND FIRST YEARS OF SERVICE FOR PLAN STANDING COMMITTEE 
MEMBERS
Name Position Home  Province
First Year  
of Service 
Adm� Wu Shengli PLAN Commander Zhejianga 1964
Lt� Gen� Miao Hua PLAN Political Commissar Fujian 1972
Vice Adm� Wang Dengping PLAN Deputy Political Commissar Anhui 1970
Vice Adm� Ding Haichun PLAN Deputy Political Commissar Hunan 1972
Vice Adm� Tian Zhong PLAN Deputy Commander Hebei 1974
Vice Adm� Jiang Weilie PLAN Deputy Commander Jiangsu 1972
Vice Adm� Liu Yi PLAN Deputy Commander Shandong 1972
Vice Adm� Ding Yi PLAN Deputy Commander Jiangsu 1976
Vice Adm� Du Jingchen PLAN Deputy Commander Shandong 1969
Vice Adm� Wang Hai PLAN Deputy Commander Zhejiang Unknown
Vice Adm� Qiu Yanpeng PLAN Chief of Staff Shandong 1974
Rear Adm� Yang Shiguang Director, PLAN Political Department Unknown Unknown
Rear Adm� Xu Weibing Director, PLAN Logistics Department Jiangsu 1978
Rear Adm� Wang Jianguo Director, PLAN Equipment Department Unknown Unknown
Note:
 a. Admiral Wu grew up in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, as his father was mayor of that city in the 1950s. However, Wu’s ancestral home is Wuqiao, 
Hebei Province, which is also the hometown of Admiral Sun Jianguo. My thanks to the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this distinction. 
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historical experiences during the early stages of their careers, access to formal 
technical and professional education, approach to doctrine, experience engag-
ing with foreign military personnel, and combat experience� This comparison is 
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The Impact of History on China’s Navy Leadership
Shared historical experiences, particularly during individuals’ “formative years” 
(late teens to early twenties), are frequently used to analyze Chinese military and 
political elites�26 Most of the officers examined here joined the military during 
these years, making this approach particularly well suited to the study of China’s 
naval leadership� Differences among the cohorts are also exacerbated by the ex-
treme changes that occurred in China over the past few decades� For example, 
while members of the navy’s Old Guard grew up under Maoist socialism and be-
gan their military careers during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, members 
of the slightly younger Rising Cohort began their careers during a period of sig-
nificant transition, for both the military and China overall� In contrast, those in 
the PLAN’s Future Leadership are some of the first officers to have never known 
anything but a stable and prosperous China increasingly powerful and confident 
on the world stage�
The Cultural Revolution and China’s Old Guard. Although many have recently 
stepped down, PLAN officers who joined the PLA in the 1960s or early 1970s 
remain in key positions� They include PLAN commander Wu Shengli as well 
as PLAN Standing Committee members deputy commander Vice Admiral Du 
Jingchen and deputy political commissar Vice Admiral Wang Dengping� Officers 
within this cohort came of age during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, a 
period during which China experienced a breakdown of society and government 
as Mao sought to reestablish authority over the country through continuous and 
often violent revolution� During this time, the lives of millions were affected, in-
cluding many of the PLAN’s Old Guard�
For example, PLAN officers who began their military careers at this time 
worked within an organization focused almost exclusively on domestic political 
issues rather than professional military training and execution� With the break-
down of political authority, PLA troops, including PLAN units, were called on 
to secure important centers of power and maintain law and order� During the 
Wuhan incident in 1967—a pitched battle between rival political factions for 
control of the Hubei provincial capital—Mao dispatched PLAN gunboats from 
the East Sea Fleet to provide support to his factions fighting in the city�27 Other 
units protected critical naval infrastructure on the Zhoushan islands near Shang-
hai, and their personnel provided temporary port labor to ensure the continued 
flow of necessary supplies�28
Opportunities for the PLAN’s Old Guard to receive formal training and pro-
fessional military education (PME) during this time were almost nonexistent� 
By the mid-1960s, most of China’s PME institutions were shut down, and formal 
training and technical knowledge were radically de-emphasized� For example, 
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previous standards that required PLA Navy submarines to be manned with a 70 : 
30 ratio of qualified to unqualified crewmen ran counter to Maoist teachings that 
political will could overcome a lack of specialized expertise, so they were revised 
to allow for as much as 80 percent of a submarine’s crew to be newly assigned, un-
qualified personnel�29 As many as 3,800 officers, including eleven rear admirals, 
were purged during this time�30
Many in the current upper echelon of navy leaders were forced to wait until the 
late 1970s to receive any form of PME� In 1964, just as many of the nation’s educa-
tional institutions were being shuttered, Admiral Wu was enrolled at the PLA Sur-
veying and Mapping College in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province, where he would remain 
until 1968�31 In 1968, Admiral Liu Xiaojiang, who only recently retired as PLAN 
political commissar, worked on a rural commune in Shaanxi as an “educated 
youth�”32 Although he joined the PLA in 1968, Admiral Sun Jianguo, the PLAN’s 
third-highest-ranking naval officer, was unable to attend the Naval Submarine 
Academy until 1978�33 Recently retired deputy commander Vice Admiral Zhang 
Yongyi had to wait years before attending the Shenyang Air Force Academy�34
From Cultural Revolution to Reform and Opening: The PLAN’s Rising Cohort. As 
the older generation of leaders retires, officers who joined the PLA in the middle- 
to-late 1970s or early 1980s are replacing them� Many of the PLAN’s newly pro-
moted Standing Committee members are part of this group, including deputy 
commanders Vice Admiral Tian Zhong and Vice Admiral Ding Yi, and chief of 
staff Vice Admiral Qiu Yanpeng� They join PLAN Logistics Department director 
Xu Weibing as part of China’s Rising Cohort of naval leaders� 
Age differences between the Old Guard and the Rising Cohort are not always 
great� The Rising Cohort’s Vice Admiral Jiang Weilie, for example, who joined 
the PLA in 1972, is not far removed from the Old Guard’s deputy political com-
missar Vice Admiral Wang Dengping or deputy commander Vice Admiral Du 
Jingchen, who joined the PLA in 1970 and 1969, respectively� Members of the 
Rising Cohort were therefore affected by the Cultural Revolution as well� Yet as 
they were just a few years younger, those experiences were often radically differ-
ent� Members of the Rising Cohort likely experienced the worst excesses of the 
Cultural Revolution as civilians, since many of the most violent events took place 
in 1967 and 1968, immediately before they joined the PLA� Absent the PLA’s in-
stitutional protections, they were more likely to have been part of the “sent-down 
youth” movement, which forced roughly 12 million urban youths to work in the 
countryside between 1968 and 1975�35 Current NSF commander Yuan Yubai, an 
older member of this cohort but one who did not join the PLA until 1973, spent 
two years as a member of his county’s “Basic Line Education Work Team,” in 
Gongan County, Hubei Province�36
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While marked by the Cultural Revolution, the PLAN’s Rising Cohort also 
benefited greatly from China’s economic reform and opening period as well as 
the PLA’s early modernization efforts, both of which began in the early 1980s� 
By 1978, Deng Xiaoping had begun dismantling the collective system of rural 
agricultural production and establishing incentives for state-owned industries 
to increase production—steps that would put the Chinese economy on the road 
to three decades of double-digit growth� Around the same time, the PLA had 
reestablished its educational and training institutions, focusing primarily on ro-
tational training and unit readiness� Cultural Revolution policies of preparing for 
total war gave way to training to fight what the PLA refers to as “local wars under 
high-tech conditions�” Most importantly, ideological purity was replaced with 
technical acumen, with a shift in emphasis back from “red” to “expert�”37 Thus the 
Rising Cohort represents the first group of leaders who did not have to transition 
from an ideological to a professional focus midway through their careers� 
A Rising and Confident China: The PLA Navy’s Future Leaders. As the Rising 
Cohort moves up the ranks, this is creating space for a younger group of offi-
cers who came of age in the late 1980s and early 1990s� While they have not 
yet ascended to top leadership positions, in all probability the PLAN’s next true 
“generation” of leaders—in the sense that they will be removed from their prede-
cessors’ experiences during the Cultural Revolution—will come from this cohort� 
Many in this younger cohort are currently serving in naval academic institutions 
or as ship commanding officers (COs) or political commissars� Examples include 
Senior Captain Li Hanjun, who until 2014 was serving as the director of the train-
ing department at PLAN headquarters and is now the director of the military 
training department at the Naval Command Academy�38 This also includes Se-
nior Captain Zhang Zheng, the CO of the PLA Navy’s aircraft carrier, Liaoning; 
Zou Fuquan, the CO of Haikou (CNS 171) during the first Gulf of Aden escort 
operation in 2008; and Senior Captain Zhao Xiaogang, the PLA Navy’s task force 
commander for China’s first-ever participation in RIMPAC�39
Born in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these officers were children or adoles-
cents during the Cultural Revolution, although it still undoubtedly influenced 
their lives� In their adult lives, however, they have experienced a much more 
stable domestic and international environment and an increasingly powerful and 
prosperous China� By the mid-to-late 1980s, when many of these officers were 
still in the early stages of their military careers, China’s relations with the United 
States and the Soviet Union had improved considerably, allowing Deng Xiaoping 
in 1985 to put forth his strategic reassessment of the current international climate 
as one in which China could expect at least two decades of international stabil-
ity�40 These changes to China’s strategic outlook mean that once these officers 
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move into top-level positions, they will be the first PLAN leadership cohort to 
have never served in a navy preparing for total war� 
China’s reassessment of its international environment also allowed the PLA 
to rethink its approach to training, modernization, and national defense� In the 
mid-1990s, Jiang Zemin’s policy of “two transformations” (liangge zhuanbian, 
两个转变) called for the army to shift from preparing to fight local wars under 
normal conditions to fighting local wars in a high-tech environment, and for the 
PLA as a whole to shift toward relying on quality rather than quantity�41 As part of 
this reassessment, the PLA Navy in particular sought to professionalize its officer 
corps and improve training and recruitment, and officers within this younger 
cohort have benefited significantly� For example, since these officers joined the 
PLA in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PLA has been downsized by roughly 
1�7 million personnel�42 In addition, while much remains unknown about the 
importance of personal connections in the PLA promotion system, this is also the 
first group of navy officers for whom actual retirement at prescribed mandatory 
ages is the standard, making promotion practices more routine� 
The PLA Navy, like the PLA more broadly, has also sought to improve reten-
tion through increased compensation and improved living standards; PLAN 
commander Wu himself has written on this subject�43 The navy’s procurement 
of advanced weaponry in the mid- and late 1990s created even greater emphasis 
on educating and training officers who could operate, support, and maintain 
these new systems�44 Thus, as this cohort of officers was joining up, the PLAN 
was beginning to recruit more college-educated personnel�45 A growing number 
of younger PLAN officers have also studied in top-tier Chinese civilian universi-
ties; they include Senior Captain Zhang Zheng, who graduated from Shanghai 
Jiaotong University in 1990 with a degree in engineering�46 While the PLAN’s 
PME system continues to undergo reforms, the improvements China’s navy has 
already made since these officers joined the PLA means the navy’s Future Leader-
ship includes some of the most highly trained and technically proficient person-
nel in the modern history of the PLAN� 47
China’s Changing Approach to Naval Doctrine 
As the PLAN leadership continues to transition to a new and younger cohort of 
leaders, so has the PLAN’s approach to doctrine changed� Members of the navy’s 
Old Guard were greatly influenced in their early careers by Mao’s views of guer-
rilla warfare, adapted to the navy in the form of “People’s War at Sea,” as well as 
Soviet naval doctrine in the form of the Young School� In contrast, members of 
the PLAN’s Rising Cohort were introduced in the early and middle stages of their 
careers to the concept of offshore or “near seas” defense (jinhai fangyu, 近海防
御), a reorientation of Chinese naval assets seaward, and an extension of China’s 
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area of operations� This gradual extension of the PLAN’s area of operations 
continued with Hu Jintao’s 2004 directive for the PLA to take on “new historic 
missions,” pushing the PLAN farther and farther afield�48 
People’s War at Sea: The Influence of Mao and the Soviet Union. Navy opera-
tions and doctrine in the PLAN’s early years were heavily influenced by two in-
dependent strands of thought: Mao’s views of guerrilla warfare and Russian views 
regarding asymmetric warfare at sea�49 While distinct approaches, both favored 
the use of smaller units operating in dispersed groups to engage in commerce 
raiding and coastal defense, and the PLAN’s approach to warfare reflected this 
influence� For example, Chinese writings on naval operations during the PLAN’s 
early years described the importance of “mak[ing] the best use of the sorghum 
fields at sea—the reefs, islets, cold, fog, and waves—and bring[ing] into full play 
the tactics and strategy of people’s war�”50
The PLAN’s early approach to war fighting can be seen in early coastal opera-
tions against Kuomintang (KMT) forces in the 1950s� In the 1954–55 naval am-
bush operations off the coast of Zhejiang, for example, the PLA Navy conducted 
surprise attacks against KMT frigates and gunships using torpedo boats hidden 
among larger merchant ships moving down the coast� These torpedo boats were 
then dispatched on a rainy night with low visibility, and were able to get within 
four kilometers of their KMT targets before being detected, successfully sinking 
the KMT frigate Taiping and KMT gunship Dongting.51
The PLAN’s limited capacity to remain at sea for prolonged periods surely lim-
ited any opportunities for members of the navy’s Old Guard to acquire blue-water 
experience early in their careers� However, this focus on hit-and-run tactics and 
guerrilla warfare shows that the PLAN’s transition to its current form resulted as 
much from a radical shift in mind-set as from the acquisition of new technology 
and operational capabilities� 
The Rising Cohort and Offshore Defense. Deng Xiaoping’s 1985 reassessment of 
the international strategic environment helped usher in a shift in the PLA Navy’s 
strategy to “offshore defense” (jinhai fangyu, 近海防御), which sought to extend 
China’s strategic maritime periphery farther from its borders� Much ink has al-
ready been spilled in analyzing in nuanced detail this shift in doctrine�52 For those 
in the navy’s Rising Cohort, however, this new doctrine fundamentally changed 
how they would think about war fighting� The PLAN would no longer use hit-
and-run tactics but instead would train and prepare to fight in “more substantial 
and organized formations�”53 
The PLAN’s shift to offshore defense would also expand its area of operations 
farther from China’s coast, creating what may be the most important difference 
between this cohort and its predecessor: namely, that a much larger component 
NWC_Spring2016Review.indb   80 3/8/16   10:29 AM
15
Becker: Who’s at the Helm? The Past, Present, and Future Leaders of China
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 B E C K E R  8 1
of the Rising Cohort has direct experience with blue-water operations�54 Such 
operations have become an increasingly important component of the PLAN’s 
regimen, and active-duty PLAN officers have not been shy in noting the impor-
tance of blue-water operations to the future of the PLAN� For example, speaking 
to the PLA Daily in 2012, current chief of staff  then–rear admiral Qiu Yanpeng 
noted, “With the constant improvement of China’s naval equipment and support 
capability, the waters for maritime training also keep expanding� Open-sea train-
ing has become an effective means and inevitable choice to enhance the combat 
capability of the PLA Navy�”55 China’s 2013 defense white paper notes that the 
PLA Navy is “intensifying blue-water training” and “improving the training 
mode of task force formation in blue water�”56
Prior to personnel changes in 2014, few members of the PLAN leadership had 
any extensive experience with blue-water operations� With the exception of Du 
Jingchen, no Standing Committee member had been involved with the PLAN’s 
Gulf of Aden escort mission, a well-known and long-standing blue-water mis-
sion�57 Now not only is Vice Admiral Du joined by Vice Admiral Qiu Yanpeng as 
another Standing Committee member with such experience (Qiu led the fourth 
escort mission, in 2010), but almost half the members of the Standing Committee 
have similar experiences leading blue-water operations�58 Other members of the 
Rising Cohort with similar blue-water experience have recently been promoted as 
well� Rear Admiral Zhang Wendan, the commander of the fifth Gulf of Aden task 
force, was recently promoted to SSF chief of staff� Rear Admiral Zhou Xuming, 
the leader of the twelfth task force, was promoted to NSF deputy commander�59 
Early blue-water operations likely carried significant weight for the few mem-
bers of the Old Guard who commanded them� For the navy’s Rising Cohort, 
however, the impact on a career of commanding a blue-water operation is not 
automatic� To paraphrase a senior PLA Navy officer:
Taking part in the escort operations is something we increasingly emphasize in 
promotion� But escort participation by itself does not guarantee promotion [emphasis 
added]� It is not the case that if you take part in the escort operations, you will  
be promoted, and if you do not take part, you will not be promoted� If you take  
part in the escort, and you show a good performance, then you may be promoted 
[paraphrase]�60 
Nor does commanding a Gulf of Aden task force specifically appear to lead 
directly to promotion� While Vice Admiral Du was promoted less than a year 
after commanding China’s first escort mission in the Gulf of Aden, no other Gulf 
of Aden task force commander was promoted so quickly� Indeed, of the first 
fourteen officers who led a Gulf of Aden escort mission between 2008 and 2013, 
six remain in the same position at the time of this writing�61
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China’s Expanding Interests Abroad and the Next Generation of PLAN Leaders. 
Since Hu Jintao’s 2004 “New Historic Missions” speech, in which he declared that 
China’s interests abroad were expanding, and that the PLA, particularly the PLA 
Navy, had an important role to play in defending those interests, the PLAN has 
extended its operations farther afield�62 Moreover, this trend appears to show no 
sign of slowing down� For example, the 2013 “Diversified Employment of China’s 
Armed Forces” notes the continuing importance of “comprehensive security” 
(zonghe anquan, 综合安全), including the strengthening of China’s overseas op-
erational capabilities such as search and rescue and emergency evacuation and 
protecting China’s overseas interests, all of which are important missions for 
China’s navy�63 One of the main themes of the 2015 defense white paper “China’s 
Military Strategy” is the need for China to “safeguard its maritime rights and 
interests,” which requires that “the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea 
must be abandoned, and great[er] importance be attached to managing the sea 
and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests�”64
These two documents continue the shift in the PLA’s focus from the land to the 
sea, and from China’s coastal and littoral regions to far-seas operations� While it is 
too soon to know for certain the impact this trend will have on the PLAN’s Future 
Leadership cohort, two distinct possibilities suggest themselves�
First, the PLA’s continued placement of greater emphasis on China’s maritime 
rights and interests may create opportunities for PLAN personnel to chip away 
slowly at the PLA ground force’s monopoly on positions of power� 
Second, as the PLAN continues to embrace its global role, the navy’s Future 
Leadership may increasingly take on the views and perspectives of officers who 
work in a truly blue-water navy� While this is not to suggest that China’s younger 
leaders will forsake traditional security operations, some PLAN personnel have 
already noted that China’s younger officers are more interested in far-seas opera-
tions outside the first island chain�65 As the PLAN continues this decades-long 
shift from being an inward-looking, coastal-defense force to an outward-looking, 
expeditionary navy, the PLAN’s next generation of leaders will have more experi-
ence at sea than any group of Chinese navy leaders in modern history�
International Engagement with Foreign Navies
Each successive cohort of PLAN leadership has become increasingly comfort-
able and confident operating in an international environment� While members 
of the navy’s Old Guard were almost completely isolated from the international 
maritime community early in their careers, those in the Rising Cohort have had 
opportunities to engage with that community, developing a confidence and so-
phistication honed from experience with naval diplomacy unavailable to most of 
their older counterparts save those of the highest rank� Yet even this confidence 
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and experience are quickly being overshadowed by those in the PLAN’s Future 
Leadership, who engage with foreign navies not only diplomatically but op-
erationally, increasingly working side by side with their foreign counterparts in 
bilateral and multilateral naval exercises as junior officers� 
For China’s Old Guard, international engagement with foreign navies came 
late in their careers� The Cultural Revolution effectively shut down China’s naval 
diplomacy, and with the exception of a handful of senior exchanges with the 
North Korean and Sri Lankan navies, China’s naval diplomacy did not restart 
until the mid-1980s�66 For example, the PLA Navy did not conduct its first port 
visit until 1985, when a three-ship task force visited Pakistan, Bangladesh, and 
Sri Lanka� The Chinese navy only began to conduct combined military exercises 
with foreign navies in earnest in the early 2000s, and the PLAN’s first bilateral 
maritime exercise in the region did not take place until 2007, when members of 
the Old Guard were already well established in their careers�
When the PLAN did begin engaging with foreign militaries, the importance 
of these initial operations meant that they were entrusted to established senior 
officers� For example, PLAN deputy commander Ding Yiping led the PLAN’s first 
global circumnavigation in 2002 as a vice admiral� Vice Admiral Du Jingchen, 
one of the PLAN’s current deputy commanders, led the PLAN’s first Gulf of Aden 
operations as the South Sea Fleet’s chief of staff, but was promoted less than a year 
later to PLAN chief of staff�
The PLAN’s Rising Cohort and Increasing International Engagement. The mem-
bers of the PLAN’s Rising Cohort have had more exposure to naval diplomacy 
engagement at much earlier stages in their careers than their predecessors� As 
the PLAN continues to be China’s primary service for military diplomacy— 
conducting counter-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, humanitarian missions 
via the PLAN’s hospital ship Peace Ark, and traditional combat exercises such as 
the annual MARITIME COOPERATION exercise with Russia—the opportunity to 
engage with foreign navy personnel has become increasingly common�67 For ex-
ample, as a senior captain commanding the East Sea Fleet’s 6th Destroyer Flotilla 
in 2007, then–rear admiral Qiu Yanpeng led the PLAN’s contingent in AMAN-07, 
a Pakistan-hosted multilateral exercise with eight other nations, including the 
United States� This marked the first time China participated in a multilateral 
combined naval exercise, the first time a PLAN task force traveled abroad with-
out a supply ship, and the first time the navy used live ammunition overseas�68 
China’s Future Leadership: Working with and alongside Foreign Navies. While the 
PLAN’s Rising Cohort has had substantial international engagement experience 
compared with the Old Guard, much of it has been limited to cursory diplomatic 
events such as meetings during port visits or communications at sea� In contrast, 
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China’s Future Leadership has begun actually operating with rather than simply 
alongside foreign navies� For example, although U�S� Navy and PLAN ships have 
been interacting in the Gulf of Aden for years, in 2013 the two navies conducted 
their first exercise in that region, which included boarding operations, live-fire 
drills, and helicopter landings�69 In September of that year the two navies con-
ducted additional exercises off the coast of Hawaii�70 In the summer of 2014, Chi-
na sent four ships to participate for the first time in RIMPAC, the world’s largest 
multilateral naval exercise� Senior Captain Zhao Xiaogang, the PLA Navy’s task 
force commander at RIMPAC 2014, and the COs of the PLAN’s four ships at the 
exercise each worked closely with ships from the U�S�, French, Singaporean, and 
other navies for weeks, conducting a wide range of drills at sea and interacting 
with them on a daily basis� 
Working so closely with foreign navies at such an early stage in one’s career 
was not a possibility for those in the PLAN’s Rising Cohort, and was unthinkable 
for Admiral Wu and other members of the Old Guard early in their careers� As 
the PLAN continues to work alongside and operate with foreign navies, China’s 
future navy leaders will be provided with a fundamentally deeper knowledge 
and understanding of foreign navies than can be claimed even by members of 
the Rising Cohort� 
Combat Experience
While younger generations of PLA Navy leaders are becoming increasingly well 
educated, trained, and experienced with operations abroad, one characteristic 
that unites all three cohorts is their lack of combat experience� Historically, the 
PLAN’s combat experience has been limited to a few operations, including the 
liberation of offshore islands from the KMT in the 1950s, two small skirmishes 
with KMT forces in 1965, and clashes with the Vietnamese navy in 1974 and 1988 
over the Paracel (Xisha) Islands and Johnson Reef (Chigua Jiao) in the Spratly 
Islands, respectively�71
We have no evidence that any of China’s current leadership has been directly 
involved in combat operations� Even the navy’s Old Guard would have been too 
young to have experienced most of the PLAN’s operations, which took place be-
fore even Admiral Wu, the PLAN’s elder statesman, joined the PLA� Many of the 
Rising Cohort joined the PLAN around the time of the PLAN’s clash with Viet-
nam over the Paracels in 1974� This includes current PLAN Standing Committee 
members Vice Admiral Tian Zhong and Vice Admiral Qiu Yanpeng as well as 
ESF deputy commander Rear Admiral Shen Hao� Again, the short, confined na-
ture of these operations likely precluded any of these officers from participating 
directly, and certainly means they were unable to garner significant combat ex-
perience even if they did participate� However, for those officers joining the PLA 
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at this time, the navy’s success likely served as a positive contrast to the failures 
of the PLA ground forces in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War�
The available evidence indicates that the closest any of China’s current navy 
leaders came to participating in any of these operations was Admiral Wu’s role 
in the 14 March 1988 Johnson South Reef skirmish (chiguajiao haizhan, 吃瓜礁 
海战)�72 Although not directly involved, Admiral Wu was serving at the time as 
commander of the East Sea Fleet’s 6th Destroyer Flotilla (zhidui, 支队), and had 
authority over the frigate Yingtan (CNS 531), which took part in the conflict�73
THE FUTURE OF PLA NAVY LEADERSHIP
With the PLA Navy undergoing one of the most substantial leadership transitions 
in recent history, this article has sought to compare and contrast the members of 
the PLAN’s Old Guard, who joined the PLA during the Cultural Revolution and 
who are fast retiring, with the Rising Cohort of leaders who are taking their place� 
The article also examines the navy’s Future Leadership, whose eventual ascent will 
mark a second watershed moment in the evolution of China’s navy leadership�
The findings above suggest that a profound shift is already under way in terms 
of the levels of professional education, training, international experience, and di-
rect experience with the navy’s new operations that the PLAN’s emerging leaders 
possess� While the Old Guard was tasked with overseeing a navy that was rapidly 
transforming, the vast majority of them had little if any personal experience with 
the skill sets they sought to develop within that navy� Although under this Old 
Guard the navy began to recruit officer candidates with greater levels of formal 
education and provide them with more-robust training, they themselves had had 
limited opportunities for such training� Although the navy began to conduct ad-
vanced blue-water operations under their tenure, very few of these leaders, who 
joined a coastal-defense force during the Cultural Revolution, had that type of 
experience themselves� 
How unique is China in this regard? Many developing navies must manage a 
certain level of inversion in the technical skills found in their institution’s person-
nel, with younger, lower-ranking members being more technically sophisticated 
than their older, higher-ranking counterparts� Developing navies in South Korea, 
India, Vietnam, and others have faced similar challenges� However, the evidence 
provided above suggests that this difference has been particularly acute for Chi-
na� Very few countries denigrated the possession of technical skill and knowledge 
or treated technical training as inversely related to political loyalty to the extent 
that China did during much of the early military careers of members of the Old 
Guard� Few countries were as closed to the outside world as China during the 
Cultural Revolution� Viewed in this context, the accomplishments of this fast-
retiring cohort of PLAN leaders are all the more remarkable�
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The article’s findings also suggest that each successive cohort of navy leader-
ship is increasingly developing the characteristics and obtaining the maritime 
engagement experiences found in the officer corps of other modern, developed 
navies� The Rising Cohort is more at ease interacting with foreign navies than 
its predecessor, while those in the Future Leadership cohort have operated with 
U�S� Navy ships and studied alongside foreign naval officers in NATO member 
countries�74 These traits will likely facilitate future engagement with naval officers 
from the United States and U�S�-allied countries, with whom they are likely to 
have more and more in common�
Despite these changes, it is important to note some of the similarities that 
remain between the old and the new� Like the Old Guard, the Rising Cohort 
is dominated by officers from China’s developed coastal provinces� Like their 
predecessors, they have a living memory of the Cultural Revolution, one of the 
most dangerous and unstable periods in modern Chinese history� Although it is 
unclear how this experience affected individual officers, they all remember a time 
when China was weak, unstable, and under constant threat of war� 
Finally, it is important to note that, despite the PLAN’s growing professional-
ism, PLA Navy leaders remain firmly embedded within the CCP� While some 
have suggested the possibility that military modernization and PLA profes-
sionalization would lead to a Huntingtonian-style transition from a party to a 
national army, this has not occurred�75 In fact, the party continues to have control 
over PLAN personnel decisions, reflected over the past few years most clearly 
in the CCP’s expansive anticorruption campaign, which has removed a number 
of senior military figures on charges of corruption or lack of party discipline� 
Within the navy, key leaders who have been caught up in the campaign include 
deputy PLAN political commissar Vice Admiral Ma Faxiang and Rear Admiral 
Jiang Zhonghua, the director of the Equipment Department for China’s South Sea 
Fleet�76 Thus, it is important to remember that despite this growing professional-
ism among PLAN personnel, China’s new navy leaders will remain subject to 
strict party control and oversight and will continue to identify first and foremost 
with the party� 
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